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ABSTRACT 
Increasingly, the production of fake news has become industrialized; enterprising 
entrepreneurs are deceiving Internet users with false information while earning sig-
nificant sums of money. The problem of fake news and misinformation, however, 
is not one solely brought about by the increase in digital technology. Historically, 
campaigns of misinformation have been used to achieve social, political, and eco-
nomic goals long before the Internet was commonplace. But, recent calls to regulate 
fake news content contravene American law and run afoul of our nation’s laissez-
faire approach to the regulation of false or misleading information. We argue that 
government-imposed, speech-limiting restrictions cannot contain fake news and, as 
a result, should not be the answer to the modern fake news epidemic. Instead, the 
key to combatting the effects of fake news lies in a variety of private-sector initia-
tives and speech-enhancing protocols. Programs designed to reiterate the im-
portance of media literacy and revitalize civic participation are the cornerstone to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a country where the average worker brings home 350 euros per month, an 
enterprising Macedonian teenager whom the BBC dubbed “Goran” earned 1,800 
euros the first month he began producing fake news content prior to the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election.1 Why did he do it? Quite simply, it was the money, he told the 
BBC: “Teenagers in our city don’t care how Americans vote. They are only satisfied 
that they make money and can buy expensive clothes and drinks!”2 Investigations 
by The Guardian and BuzzFeed revealed that Veles, Macedonia, the small town 
where Goran lives, had registered more than 150 websites supporting Donald 
Trump prior to the election.3 In a 2017 profile of Veles, Wired magazine writer 
Samantha Subramanian relayed the story of an 18-year-old called “Boris,” whose 
“English is halting and fractured—certainly not good enough to turn out five to [ten] 
articles about Trump and Clinton every day for weeks on end.”4 Yet, in the three 
months leading up to the election, his two websites garnered $16,000; his foray into 
fake news paid off enough that he even stopped attending high school.5 And given 
the economics of the situation, who could fault his youthful indiscretion? 
As major news corporations fret over declining advertising revenue and waning 
readership, purveyors of fake news content are reaping the rewards. This article 
discusses how the existence of fake news—however one defines the concept—can 
be traced alongside the development of modern media. But, the recent alarm over 
fake news, though often poorly articulated, seems to stem from the amplification of 
misinformation made possible by the growth of social media. If more than two-
thirds of American adults get their news from social media, as a recent study sug-
gests, then concern over the spread of fake news on various social media platforms 
is understandable.6 But, to date, little has been done—either politically, economi-
cally, or socially—to effectively control the impact of fake news. Our previous re-
search discussed global attempts to regulate fake news, arguing that such attempts 
are largely impractical.7 Alternatively, we advocated for greater emphasis on media 
literacy to mitigate the effects of fake news.8 Now, we consider possible means of 
upending the economic benefits associated with producing fake news while sug-
gesting incentives for the distribution of truthful information that address matters 
of public concern. 
This article explores the increasing industrial production of fake news content 
with an eye toward the economics of the practice. In Part II, we discuss the rise of 
fake news in the modern era, noting the problem is not one solely brought about by                                                           
 1. Emma Jane Kirby, The City Getting Rich from Fake News, BBC (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-38168281. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Dan Tynan, How Facebook Powers Money Machines for Obscure Political ‘News’ Sites, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/24/facebook-clickbait-
political-news-sites-us-election-trump. 
 4. Samanth Subramanian, Inside the Macedonian Fake-News Complex, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Sep. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/. 
 7. Amy Kristin Sanders, Rachael L. Jones & Xiran Liu, Stemming the Tide of Fake News: A Global 
Case Study of Decisions to Regulate, 8 J. OF INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 
48) (on file with authors). 
 8. Id. 
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the increase in digital technology. In Part III, we examine the history and economics 
of fake news in comparison to the economics of the mainstream media from the 
“dot.com era” forward. Part IV asserts that regulating fake news content contra-
venes American law and emphasizes our nation’s historical lack of regulation aimed 
at curbing false or misleading information. Part V makes a theory-based argument 
to promote various approaches to combatting fake news in the hopes of limiting 
government intervention in speech. In our conclusion, we assert that government-
imposed, speech-limiting restrictions will not contain fake news and, as a result, are 
not the answer to the modern fake news epidemic. Instead, a variety of private-
sector initiatives and speech-enhancing protocols should be implemented to revital-
ize civic participation and reiterate the importance of media literacy in a digital 
world. 
II. THE RISE OF MODERN FAKE NEWS 
Before discussing the recent alarm over the rise of fake news, it is important to 
understand the meaning of the term. The definition of fake news, like its practice, 
is slippery. If one were to go by U.S. President Donald Trump’s assertions, broad-
cast news networks ABC, CBS, and NBC, along with CNN,9 The New York Times,10 
and Washington Post11 are fake news. In fact, in a May 2018 tweet, Trump equated 
news that is negative with fake news: 
The Fake News is working overtime. Just reported that, despite the tre-
mendous success we are having with the economy & all things else, 91% 
of the Network News about me is negative (Fake). Why do we work so 
hard in working with the media when it is corrupt? Take away creden-
tials?12 
However, pinning down an actual definition of fake news, which is necessary 
to frame an argument about how to control its spread, is critical to the discussion. 
In general, the term fake news is used far too loosely by both the president and the 
populace alike. For example, The Telegraph noted the following: 
‘Fake news’ was not a term many people used 18 months ago, but it is now 
seen as one of the greatest threats to democracy, free debate[,] and the                                                           
 9. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 3, 2018, 3:34 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/981117684489379840 (“The Fake News Networks, those that know-
ingly have a sick and biased AGENDA, are worried about the competition and quality of Sinclair Broad-
cast. The “Fakers” at CNN, NBC, ABC & CBS have done so much dishonest reporting that they should 
only be allowed to get awards for fiction!”). 
 10. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 12, 2018, 3:03 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/984371491277099010 (“If I wanted to fire Robert Mueller in Decem-
ber, as reported by the Failing New York Times, I would have fired him. Just more Fake News from a 
biased newspaper!”). 
 11. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 19, 2017, 7:07 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/943135588496093190 (“A story in the @washingtonpost that I was 
close to “rescinding” the nomination of Justice Gorsuch prior to confirmation is FAKE NEWS. I never 
even wavered and am very proud of him and the job he is doing as a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The unnamed sources don’t exist!”). 
 12. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 9, 2018, 4:38 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/994179864436596736. 
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Western order. As well as being a favourite [sic] term of Donald Trump, it 
was also named 2017’s word of the year. . . .13 
A number of definitions for fake news—many of which are quite helpful in 
thinking about the issue—have emerged in recent months. CNN Editor-at-Large, 
Chris Cillizza, whose coverage of the Trump White House has been relentless, de-
fined fake news as “made-up news. It’s not based on traditional reporting values 
like facts and sourcing. It’s not ‘news’ at all.”14 The Telegraph, in its Technology 
Intelligence column, outlined five types of fake news that highlight the controversy 
over how to define the term: “(1) commercially driven sensational content, (2) na-
tion state-sponsored misinformation, (3) highly partisan news sites, (4) social media 
itself, and (5) satire or parody.”15 Many media scholars argue the last two categories 
outlined by The Telegraph are not actually fake news.16 Certainly, social media 
contributes to the spread of fake news, but it is not in itself fake news.17 
Social media platforms are home to many professional news organizations 
whose content is shared in the same manner as fake news. Additionally, and perhaps 
most importantly, much of the content shared on social media is not news at all. For 
example, cat videos and other comedic sketches, whether legitimately filmed or 
doctored by enterprising click-bait18 purveyors, hardly constitute information that 
is a matter of public concern. Similarly, satire and parody—whether editorial car-
toons, completely fictitious newspapers, or late-night television shows—long pre-
date the modern concern with fake news content.19 As a result, those who bemoan 
fake news as a recent development are misinformed.20 
Rather, our ability to share fake news with impunity, as well as to monetize 
such behavior, has increased with the enormous influence of social media and the 
public’s growing distrust of mainstream media as a source of news and information, 
as well as lack of trust in other major social institutions. In 2017, the Pew Research 
Center found “the emergence of trust-jarring digital interactions has also coincided 
with a sharp decline in trust for major institutions, such as government (and Con-
gress and the presidency), the news media, public schools, the church[,] and 
                                                          
 13. James Carson, Fake News: What Exactly is it – and How Can You Spot it?, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 30, 
2018, 10:51 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/fake-news-exactly-has-really-had-influ-
ence/. 
 14. Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump Just Accidentally Revealed Something Very Important About His 
‘Fake News’ Attacks, CNN (May 9, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/09/politics/don-
ald-trump-media-tweet/index.html. 
 15. Carson, supra note 13. 
 16. Daniel Funke, Is it Satire or Fake News? Depends on Who You Ask, POYNTER (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.poynter.org/news/it-satire-or-fake-news-depends-who-you-ask. 
 17. See id.; Explained: What is Fake News?, WEBWIDE, https://www.webwise.ie/teachers/what-is-
fake-news/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Explained]. 
 18. Click-bait refers to sensational headlines that misconstrue to content of an article in an attempt to 
get readers to click-through to the whole article. Common examples include phrases such as “ . . . and 
you won’t believe what happened next.” Remington Begg, 4 Reasons Not to Use Clickbait Headlines in 
Your Content Marketing, IMPULSIVE CREATIVE (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.impulsecrea-
tive.com/blog/4-reasons-not-to-use-clickbait-headlines-in-your-content-marketing/. 
 19. See generally Jacob Soll, The Long and Brutal History of Fake News, POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-violent-214535. 
 20. See id.; Jarrett Stepman, We Already Have a Solution to Fake News: It’s Called the First Amend-
ment, INSIDER (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/insider/fall-2017-insider/we-already-have-solu-
tion-fake-news-its-called-the-first-amendment. 
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banks.”21 Despite these declines in trust, use of the Internet and social media for 
news and information consumption is on the rise. A January 2018 report from the 
Pew Research Center details how people in 38 countries get their news from social 
media, providing insight into global consumption habits.22 In nearly every country, 
respondents with more education were more likely to get their news from social 
media.23 Similarly, respondents ages 18–29 were more likely to get their news from 
social media than respondents ages 30–49 or 50 and older.24 
Americans surveyed by the Pew Research Center in December 2016 expressed 
concern over sharing fake news via social media. More than two-thirds agreed that 
“fabricated news stories cause a great deal of confusion about the basic facts of 
current issues and events.”25 Another 24% believed it caused some confusion, 
meaning nearly 90% of Americans in 2016 believed fake news has at least some 
impact on perceptions of truth.26 Yet, nearly one-quarter of those respondents also 
admitted to having shared fake news on the Internet, with 14% reporting they knew 
it was fake when they shared it.27 
In general, media scholars often describe fake news as including two kinds of 
information: misinformation and disinformation.28 However, the difference be-
tween the two is often conflated. The National Endowment for Democracy notes 
that disinformation is the purposeful “dissemination . . . of false reports intended to 
mislead public opinion.”29 On the other hand, misinformation comprises any infor-
mation that is incorrect—regardless of the intent with which it is shared.30 As media 
scholar Brian G. Southwell and his co-authors point out, misinformation can include 
“contentious information reflecting disagreement among people,” which might in-
clude whether Pluto should be considered a planet.31 Thus, misinformation contrasts 
with disinformation, which the article describes as involving “deliberate alienation 
or disempowerment of other people.”32 
A recent scholarly review of 34 articles published “between 2003 and 2017 
resulted in a typology of . . . fake news [that included] news satire, news parody, 
                                                          
 21. Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Fate of Online Trust in the Next Decade, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 
10, 2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/up-
loads/sites/14/2017/08/09163223/PI_2017.08.10_onlineTrustNextDecade_FINAL.pdf. 
 22. Amy Mitchell et al., Publics Globally Want Unbiased News Coverage, But are Divided on 
Whether Their News Media Deliver, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2018), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/01/11/publics-globally-want-unbiased-news-coverage-but-are-di-
vided-on-whether-their-news-media-deliver/. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Michael Barthel, Amy Mitchell & Jesse Holcomb, Many Americans Believe Fake News is Sowing 
Confusion, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-be-
lieve-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion/. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See generally Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Zheng Wei Lim & Richard Ling, Defining “Fake News”: A 
Typology of Scholarly Definitions, 6 DIG. JOURNALISM 137–53 (2018). 
 29. Dean Jackson, Issue Brief: Distinguishing Disinformation from Propaganda, Misinformation, and 
“Fake News”, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.ned.org/issue-brief-
distinguishing-disinformation-from-propaganda-misinformation-and-fake-news/. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Brian G. Southwell, Emily A. Thorson & Laura Sheble, The Persistence and Peril of Misinfor-
mation, 105 AM. SCIENTIST 372 (Dec. 2017), https://www.americanscientist.org/article/the-persistence-
and-peril-of-misinformation. 
 32. Id. 
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fabrication, manipulation, advertising, and propaganda.”33 The study continues, 
noting, “Contemporary discourse, particularly in media coverage, seems to define 
fake news as viral posts based on fictitious accounts made to look like news re-
ports.”34 The article notes that definitions of the term have varied over time, making 
reference to how the term has been co-opted to discredit mainstream reporting that 
is deemed critical in its coverage. 
Claire Wardle at First Draft News devised a continuum of misinformation and 
disinformation, ranging from satire and parody on one side, fabricated content on 
the other, and false connections, misleading content, false context, imposter content, 
and manipulated content rounding out the middle.35 For the purposes of this article, 
we define fake news as including all of Wardle’s categories except satire or parody. 
Though it is true that this type of speech has the potential to fool an audience, the 
motivation behind it differs greatly from the other six types of content. Wardle de-
fines the categories as follows: 
 False connection: When headlines, visuals or captions don’t support 
the content. 
 Misleading content: Misleading use of information to frame an indi-
vidual or issue. 
 False context: When genuine content is shared with false contextual 
information. 
 Imposter content: When genuine sources are impersonated. 
 Manipulated content: When genuine information or imagery is ma-
nipulated to deceive. 
 Fabricated content: New content that is 100% false, designed to de-
ceive and do harm.36 
III. THE HISTORY AND ECONOMICS OF FAKE NEWS 
As noted earlier, the concept of intentionally distributing misinformation pre-
dates the Internet.37 Governments and individuals have long capitalized on the ef-
fects of spreading falsities to gain advantage for political, economic, or social rea-
sons. For example, the 2016 “Pizzagate” scandal, where an armed North Carolina 
man stormed a Washington, D.C. pizza parlor after reading Internet musings that 
asserted the restaurant was at the center of a child-sex ring connected to Hilary 
                                                          
 33. Tandoc Jr., Lim & Ling, supra note 28, at 137. 
 34. Id. at 138. 
 35. Claire Wardle, Fake News. It’s Complicated., FIRST DRAFT NEWS (Feb. 16, 2017), https://first-
draftnews.org/fake-news-complicated/. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Soll, supra note 19. 
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Clinton,38 will go down in fake news history along with a long line of events fueled 
by false information. 
Although it is easy to blame social media for the spread of misinformation and 
disinformation, similar trends in the spread of misinformation can be linked to the 
development of nearly every new medium. Recent accounts detailing the history of 
fake news have emerged in the hopes of situating fake news in a proper historical 
context by illustrating earlier attempts at subverting public opinion.39 Take Johan-
nes Gutenberg’s printing press as an example. A 2017 Politico article described 
how early campaigns used fake news to smear religious groups, noting that made-
up stories were published in the late 1400s that asserted Jews drank the blood of 
Christian children.40 More recently, the debate rages over whether 1938 radio 
broadcasts of Orson Welles’s The War of the Worlds fooled some listeners into 
thinking extraterrestrial invasions actually threatened Earth.41 Was it true? Of 
course not. Did it likely fool some audience members whose media literacy skills 
were lacking? Probably so. We must also consider the widely discussed 1990s In-
ternet scams42 that took hold as the world embraced email.43 According to network 
security experts around the world, these basic Internet scams continue to evolve into 
more complex phishing scams that dupe unsuspecting email users.44 
Perhaps the most common motivation for fake news, both historically and in 
the present day, is political or ideological in nature—fake content designed to sway 
public opinion on societal issues.45 In Italy, the term “pasquinde” was coined to 
describe Pietro Aretino’s fictitious writings aimed at interfering with a pontifical 
election during the 16th century.46 A century later, French satirists regularly vilified 
Marie Antoinette and other political figures in the hopes of disrupting their influ-
ence.47 Since then, little has changed. In its 2017 white paper, “The Fake News 
Machine,” security firm Trend Micro identified three major motivations behind the 
current spread of fake news: political influence, financial gain, and character assas-
sination.48 
                                                          
 38. Faiz Siddiqui & Susan Svrluga, N.C. Man Told Police He Went to D.C. Pizzeria with Gun to 
Investigate Conspiracy Theory, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com. 
 39. See, e.g., Mark Memmott, 75 Years Ago, ‘War of the Worlds’ Started a Panic. Or Did It?, NPR 
(Oct. 30, 2013, 8:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/10/30/241797346/75-years-
ago-war-of-the-worlds-started-a-panic-or-did-it; Soll, supra note 19. 
 40. Soll, supra note 19. 
 41. Memmott, supra note 39. 
 42. As the Internet was becoming commonplace, unsuspecting users would regularly open check their 
email only to find a new message in their Inbox purporting to be from a Nigerian prince or other figure 
in need who would send them money for helping with a minor task if the recipient would provide the 
“prince” with personal information such as bank account numbers. As a result, many users were swindled 
out of money. Lily Hay Newman, Nigerian Email Scammers are More Effective Than Ever, WIRED 
(May 3, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/nigerian-email-scammers-more-effective-than-
ever/. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Frankie Leung, Tips on Protection Against Phishing Scam, CYBER SECURITY INFO. PORTAL (June 
1, 2018), https://www.cybersecurity.hk/en/expert-2018-06-01-Phishing-Scam.php. 
 45. Lion Gu, Vladimir Kropotov & Fyodor Yarochkin, Fake News and Cyber Propaganda: The Use 
and Abuse of Social Media, TREND MICRO (June 13, 2017), https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/secu-
rity/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/fake-news-cyber-propaganda-the-abuse-of-social-media. 
 46. Robert Darnton, The True History of Fake News, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 13, 2017), 
http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/02/13/the-true-history-of-fake-news/. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Gu, Krpoptov & Yarochkin, supra note 45. 
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Although the political motivation to create fake news is worthy of examination, 
we focus our attention on the economic motivation. For the right price, a person or 
organization can impact public opinion on the topic of their choice. In its report, 
Trend Micro gives several alarming examples of the economics of fake news: 
$2,600 can buy a social media account with more than 300,000 followers, and 
$55,000 can fund a Twitter attack that successfully discredits a journalist.49 With 
around $400,000, Trend Micro estimates that a person could influence policy 
changes on trade agreements, impact elections, or change the course of a referen-
dum.50 
While the manipulation of media is old news, making money off of fake news 
is on the rise. For example, massive “click farms” have cropped up in Asia, where 
you can pay for likes from phony social media profiles.51 Additionally, Internet 
quizzes have sprung up, subscribing users to a “service that charges $9.95 per 
month.”52 In the same vein, Facebook scammers use the data people share to learn 
their “elf name” to create marketable profiles for data-mining companies.53 As long 
as the profit expected from fake news exceeds the cost of producing fake news, the 
market conditions will support the enterprise. 
Fake news purveyors, like most entrepreneurs, have the ability to calculate the 
likelihood that their venture will generate profit. Researchers Nir Khestri and Jef-
frey Voas created a formula to illustrate the economics of fake news: “Mb + Pb > Ic 
+ O1c + Pc + (O2cπarrπcon).”54 In their equation, the benefits of producing fake news 
(the left side of the equation) must outweigh the possible drawbacks (the right side) 
for someone to be economically incentivized to produce fraudulent content.55 On 
the left side of the equation, Mb stands for the economic benefit while Pb stands for 
the noneconomic (or psychological) benefit.56 The right side of the equation illus-
trates the more complex costs of the enterprise.57 These include “investment costs 
(Ic), opportunity costs of creation (O1c), psychological costs of creation (Pc), and the 
monetary opportunity costs of criminal conviction (O2c) tempered by the likelihood 
of arrest (πarr) and conviction (πcon).”58 Although some countries have criminal-
ized the creation and distribution of fake news,59 the chances of someone getting 
caught still remain relatively slim. Although some advocate altering the economic 
landscape of fake news through further criminalization of speech, that is not the 
course of action we propose for a number of reasons outlined below.60 
                                                          
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Louise Matsakis, Look at This Massive Click Fraud Farm That Was Just Busted in Thai-
land, VICE (June 12, 2017), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/43yqdd/look-at-this-massive-
click-fraud-farm-that-was-just-busted-in-thailand. 
 52. Top 5 Social Media Scams, NORTON BY SYMANTEC, https://ie.norton.com/internetsecurity-online-
scams-top-5-social-media-scams.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2018). 
 53. Lindsey Murray, Police Warn: Taking Facebook Quizzes Could Get Your Identity Stolen, GOOD 
HOUSEKEEPING (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.goodhousekeeping.com/life/news/a47419/facebook-quiz-
identity-risk/. 
 54. Nir Kshetri & Jeffrey Voas, The Economics of “Fake News”, IT PROF., Nov./Dec. 2017, at 2. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Sanders, Jones & Liu, supra note 7. 
 60. Id. 
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IV. FAKE NEWS UNDER AMERICAN LAW: WHY REGULATION IS NOT 
ADVISABLE 
Fake news and its side effects continue to plague the United States’ news cycle 
even after the controversial 2016 presidential election.61 However, the fake news 
phenomenon is hardly novel; in fact, the recent election is not the first American 
election to endure the drama and controversy of false news stories.62 Records of 
fake news content aimed at damaging political figures go as far back the Founding 
Fathers. As journalism professor Barbara Freidman explained, “[t]he notion of ob-
jectivity as we think of it today didn’t exist in the early 19th century. Instead, there 
was a long history of newspapers being supported by political patronage.”63 The 
contentious nature of objectivity was so prevalent in the early years of the republic 
that in an 1807 letter, Thomas Jefferson noted, “Nothing can now be believed which 
is seen in a newspaper” because of the rampant use of rumor.64 Jefferson chided that 
newspapers should work to alleviate the problem “by restraining themselves to true 
facts and sound principles only.”65 Thus, America’s battle between impassioned, 
biased, and often false “news” stories has raged for centuries. 
Despite the continuing problem of fake news in American society, the nation 
has done little to formally address or regulate it. Recent ire over the perceived uptick 
in the amount of available fake news content has led many to call for a regulatory 
solution.66 However, the robust protection of free speech and press in the United 
States is not easily thwarted. In this section, we discuss why attempts at regulating 
fake news would ultimately fail in the United States through an examination of the 
popular theories of free expression in First Amendment law. 
Proponents of fake news regulation at the federal or state level will find the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution to be a formidable opponent. 
First Amendment jurisprudence provides protection for false speech of this nature.67 
Though the Supreme Court has denounced the value of false speech in years past,68 
it is not wholly without First Amendment protection.69 Currently, false statements 
of fact receive base-level protection absent a legally cognizable harm.70 Although 
some may claim that any degree of protection for false content is problematic in the 
wake of the “fake news epidemic,” such protection is inherent in First Amendment 
doctrine.71 In fact, one of the main defenses for this protection lies in one of the core 
                                                          
 61. See, e.g., Ramona Pringle, Fake News, Even Fake Fact-Checkers, Found in Run-up to U.S. Mid-
terms, CBC (Nov. 6, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/fake-news-midterm-elec-
tions-1.4892305. 
 62. Steven Seidenberg, Fake News Has Long Held a Role in American History, A.B.A. J. (July 2017), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/history_fake_news?icn=most_read. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell, (June 14, 1807), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONST. (U. 
of Chicago Press 2000), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs29.html. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Sanders, Jones & Liu, supra note 7. 
 67. Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News”, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 305 (2017). 
 68. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). In dicta, the Court has indicated that false 
statements of fact have little constitutional value; see also Levi, supra note 67, at 305. 
 69. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012). In Alvarez, the Court indicated that falsity 
alone is not enough criminally punish speech in striking down the Stolen Valor Act; see also Levi, supra 
note 67, at 305. 
 70. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719. 
 71. Id.; see also David S. Han, Categorizing Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 613, 639–40 (2018). 
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principles of First Amendment law: regulations that are content-based are presump-
tively unconstitutional.72 
Generally, government regulations may not proscribe speech based on its con-
tent—the ideas expressed or subject matter of the speech.73 This bedrock of Amer-
ican free speech doctrine is supported by two primary justifications. First, the First 
Amendment is understood to take a “non-paternalistic attitude” toward the recipi-
ents of speech.74 In other words, it does not discriminate among messages; rather, 
the audience members are expected to decide for themselves whether they wish to 
listen or receive certain content and, moreover, whether they deem the speech of-
fensive or noteworthy.75 Second, content-based regulations have the capacity to dis-
tort public discourse.76 As a rule, First Amendment doctrine shies away from any 
regime in which one actor, specifically the government, holds a monopoly on public 
discourse.77 Content-based regulations, if permitted, have the capacity to manipu-
late the speech marketplace by allowing state actors to discriminate among mes-
sages and speakers.78 If such regulations were permitted, they would be ripe for 
abuse; after all, it would be easy for government actors to introduce regulatory 
schemes that would further their own platforms.79 
Both of these justifications stem from broader theories of freedom of expres-
sion, namely the Marketplace Theory and the Democratic Self-Governance Theory. 
The Marketplace Theory, or the “Marketplace of Ideas,” was introduced into the 
First Amendment canon in 1919.80 The concept of the marketplace was built upon 
ideas presented by both John Stuart Mill and John Milton.81 The marketplace rep-
resents the proverbial area where public discourse takes place.82 In the marketplace, 
citizens engage with ideas that are introduced by a multitude of speakers.83 Using 
their own discernment, the public then promotes certain ideas that are truthful or 
                                                          
 72. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 73. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 74. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 33 (3d ed. 2010). 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382; Emily A. Thorson & Stephan Stohler, Maladies in the Misinformation 
Marketplace, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 442, 444 (2017); see also Anna Gonzalez & David Schulz, 
Helping Truth with its Boots: Accreditation as an Antidote to Fake News, 127 YALE L. J. FORUM 315, 
322 (2017). 
 78. Gonzalez & Schulz, supra note 77, at 322; Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 Sup. Ct. 2218, 2234 
(2015) (Breyer, J., concurring); Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New 
York, 447 U.S. 530, 537–38 (1980) (“If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, governments 
must not be allowed to choose ‘which issues are worth discussing or debating. . . .’”). 
 79. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 844–49 (2010). 
 80. The concept of the Marketplace of Ideas was first utilized by the United States Supreme Court in 
the case of Abrams v. United States, in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to the concept of 
the marketplace in his dissent. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). It remains one of the most commonly cited 
theories to support the freedom of speech in the United States; see Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. 
for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 592 (1980); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 
(1969). 
 81. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING TO 
THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
 82. Collective discourse arises from the marketplace naturally—a byproduct of the First Amendment 
itself. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 Sup. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). 
 83. Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845, 851–54 (2018). 
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“good.”84 Meanwhile, speech that is of little societal value dissipates when it goes 
unsupported in the marketplace.85 Thus, under this theory, “good speech” is viewed 
as the cure for “bad speech.”86 The idea is that the marketplace allows the best and 
most truthful statements to thrive and rise to the forefront of public discourse while 
simultaneously eradicating false or misleading speech.87 The Marketplace Theory 
ultimately posits that the citizenry—from the institutionalized press to anonymous 
users on Twitter—will hold truthful and valuable speech in esteem and discredit 
harmful or misleading speech in the name of maintaining integrity in public dis-
course.88 
Although the Marketplace Theory focuses on public discourse as a whole, the 
Democratic Self-Governance Theory provides a more introspective view of free 
expression. The Self-Governance Theory, introduced through the work of Ameri-
can legal scholar and philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, holds that nothing should 
hinder a citizen’s access to information.89 For a citizen to make informed decisions 
about their government and personal beliefs, they “must have access to all infor-
mation deemed pertinent to their decision-making, which includes access to data, 
opinion, records, and criticisms.”90 Thus, speech plays an “intensely individual-
ist[ic] role” in a healthy democracy.91 
As legal scholar Martin H. Redish asserted, the uninhibited flow of expression 
allows for self-realization.92 Moreover, the free flow of information is shown to lead 
to a more versed, tolerant society.93 The prevailing theories of free speech demon-
strate that the freedom to speak and to listen encourages deliberation on the part of 
the citizenry, especially on matters of political concern.94 Thus, great benefit exists 
to protect any form of speech that promotes deliberation and self-realization. It is 
for this reason that the Self-Governance Theory naturally provides robust protection 
for political speech given that the ability to access information and express beliefs 
are vital mechanisms for discerning political truth.95 In the same vein, the Market-
place Theory curtails any censorship of speech that could influence the political 
public discourse. Content-based regulations on speech thwart both theories by lim-
                                                          
 84. See generally MILTON, supra note 81. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[T]he remedy to 
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.”). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See Thorson & Stohler, supra note 77, at 444. 
 89. The Theory of Democratic Self-governance was adopted into First Amendment jurisprudence in 
1927. In Whitney, Justice Louis Brandeis used the theory to support his concurring opinion, stating that 
“the final end of [a] state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary . . . that freedom to think as you will and to speak as 
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech 
and assembly discussion would be futile[.]” 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 90. Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Free-
dom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 73 (1989); Sanders, Jones & Liu, supra note 7, at 38. 
 91. Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Governance Value, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1251, 
1261 (2006). 
 92. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982). 
 93. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc. ed. 1986). 
 94. See generally Lidsky, supra note 79. 
 95. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255 
(1961); Sanders, Jones & Liu, supra note 7. 
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iting the amount and type of speech available to the public, which hinders the mar-
ketplace and denies citizens access to information that may serve their political in-
quiries and decision-making.96 
Regulations aimed at fake news are fundamentally content-based.97 Thus, the 
likelihood that such regulations are unconstitutional, both facially and as applied, is 
high. Crafting a regulation that is narrowly tailored to address the fake news prob-
lem without subsuming protected speech as well is a daunting task. Moreover, reg-
ulation aimed at censoring fake news content has a paternalistic undertone that is 
antithetical to First Amendment doctrine. This type of content-based regulation is 
aimed at controlling the type of speech available, meaning it serves to hinder the 
marketplace of ideas and the citizenry’s access to information that may be useful 
for self-governance purposes. However, despite the strong protections afforded to 
false content of this nature, the harms associated with the proliferation of fake news 
warrant further discussion. In the following section, we address potential solutions 
to the fake news problem through a discussion of the nature of fake news and the 
law. 
V.   MASSAGING THE MARKET: THEORY-BASED SOLUTIONS TO THE 
FAKE NEWS EPIDEMIC 
There is little question that fake news has affected public discourse.98 However, 
the extent of that impact often depends on political beliefs of the person conducting 
the analysis of its impact.99 This is an example of the problem with fake news as a 
concept and in practice: despite being false speech, it is not completely valueless in 
society. Although false speech is of low value in the First Amendment context,100 
                                                          
 96. Han, supra note 71, at 623. 
 97. See generally Flemming Rose & Jacob Mchangama, History Proves How Dangerous it is to Have 




 98. See Nsikan Akpan, The Very Real Consequences of Fake News Stories and Why Your Brain Can’t 
Ignore Them, PBS (Dec. 5, 2016, 6:06 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/real-consequences-
fake-news-stories-brain-cant-ignore. Of course, the most notable incidents involving fake news center 
around the 2016 presidential election. The harshest accusation is that the outcome of the election was 
influenced by fake news. However, these claims are hard to verify due to the variety of factors which 
affected discourse during the election. For an overview of the impact of fake news on the election, see 
generally Danielle Kurtzleben, Did Fake News on Facebook Help Elect Trump? Here’s What We Know, 
NPR (Apr. 11, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601323233/6-facts-we-know-about-
fake-news-in-the-2016-election; Aaron Blake, A New Study Suggests Fake News Might Have Won Don-
ald Trump the 2016 Election, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2018/04/03/a-new-study-suggests-fake-news-might-have-won-donald-trump-the-2016-elec-
tion/?utm_term=.03a1ae82b4d9; Carol D. Leonnig, Tom Hamburger & Rosalind S. Helderman, Russian 




 99. See Erik Wemple, Study: 42 Percent of Republicans Believe Accurate — But Negative — Stories 
Qualify as ‘Fake News’, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-
wemple/wp/2018/01/16/study-42-percent-of-republicans-believe-accurate-but-negative-stories-qualify-
as-fake-news/?utm_term=.8ebd86eebf27. 
 100. See generally Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 
(2015). 
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purveyors and consumers of fake news could argue that it has high value. This is 
likely caused by fake news content that promotes ideology rather than fact— often 
addressing the political and social issues at the heart of the First Amendment’s pro-
tection. In recent years, what we consider fake news has grown from mere false and 
misleading content to political signaling and personal branding.101 
Of course, this shift from mere false content to a new form of political signaling 
only complicates the question of regulation. Because fake news has taken on a po-
liticized persona in public debate, governmental regulation seems highly aspira-
tional.102 Because fake news targets listeners directly while undermining speech in-
directly,103 we must consider that laws alone—even great ones that champion free 
speech like the First Amendment—cannot protect us from the impacts of fake news 
and other forms of false political speech. Rather, we believe education is the key 
weapon in the war against fake news. For this reason, and the legal theories de-
scribed in Part III, we argue that more speech, particularly in the form of content-
neutral government support for public media and media literacy, holds the most 
promise for combatting fake news. 
A. Online Platforms, Advertising, and Economic Incentives 
Historically, the government acted as the gatekeeper for speech, with courts 
and legislatures determining how and when regulation was permissible.104 How-
ever, in our increasingly digital society, major internet companies and technology 
firms such as telecommunication giant Comcast, search-engine behemoth Google, 
and social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter have become the arbiters of 
speech, and they are not subject to the First Amendment’s constraints.105 Because 
these companies maintain no real interest in asserting editorial control over the con-
tent they distribute, it should come as no surprise that fake news found its stride on 
social media.106 Thanks to social media’s speed, low cost, and wide reach, these 
global platforms provide an unprecedented pulpit for the dissemination of fake 
news.107 
Currently, the major internet service providers (“ISPs”) and platforms are em-
broiled in the battle against fake news, each working towards tech-based solutions 
                                                          
 101. See supra Parts II, III. 
 102. See Seidenberg, supra note 62; Explained, supra note 17; see also Cristina Tardáguila et al., Fake 
News is Poisoning Brazilian Politics. WhatApp Can Stop it., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/opinion/brazil-election-fake-news-whatsapp.html. 
 103. Fake news is often aimed at listeners that have specific ideological views. However, the side effect 
of this targeting leads to the heart of the fake news problem: Calls for regulation. While no regulation 
has been passed, the entire fake news debate has eroded the public’s trust in media and the marketplace. 
 104. See generally Paul Levinson, Government Regulation of Social Media Would be a ‘Cure’ Far 
Worse Than the Disease, CONVERSATION (Nov. 28, 2017, 6:25 AM), https://theconversation.com/gov-
ernment-regulation-of-social-media-would-be-a-cure-far-worse-than-the-disease-86911. 
 105. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Govern-
ance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149 (2018) (explaining how new 
technology, through private governance, affects communications and speech). 
 106. See Maggie Fox, Fake News: Lies Spread Faster on Social Media Than Truth Does, NBC NEWS 
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/fake-news-lies-spread-faster-social-me-
dia-truth-does-n854896. 
 107. Sanders, Jones & Liu, supra note 7. 
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to curtail the “fake news pandemic.”108 Facebook received significant public criti-
cism, and in response it made a public showing of attempts to regulate fake news 
on its site.109 The platform has actively worked to remove economic incentives for 
fake news content by limiting advertising space, and has even relied on its users and 
the will of the marketplace to alert the platform to fake news content.110 Moreover, 
Facebook and other platforms have introduced algorithms to curtail the spread of 
fake news.111 
Although these attempts at self-regulation may seem admirable, their success 
remains modest at best. As Lilli Levi writes, social media platforms’ “financial 
models rely on advertising and on scraping as much data as possible from the online 
activities of all their users to attract advertisers.”112 As a result, platform-based re-
sponses to concerns about fake news may only survive so long as they are econom-
ically, socially, and politically feasible.113 However, the marketplace, though slow 
to react, has a way of making its desires known. After trust in social media news 
sources eroded through the 2016 election, many online users criticized the sites for 
the spread of misinformation.114 This “dip” in reputation affected both social media 
and advertising platforms alike, leading companies to reconsider their role in the 
spread of fake news.115 For example, after backlash erupted over offensive and 
questionable messaging, advertising companies became more sensitive to the type 
of content placed near its ads.116 
Financial inducements in the form of advertising revenue have proven a strong 
economic incentive in the fight against fake news. Sites like YouTube and Google 
average $35 billion in advertising revenue and account for 42% of the digital ad-
vertising market.117 Thus, social media platforms have a significant interest in ap-
peasing consumers to facilitate advertising revenue. This powerful motivator has 
already proven its influence on online platforms, spurring them to be more con-
scious of fake news phenomenon. Law professor Lilli Levi writes the following: 
[social media platforms may use] economic incentives to tweak . . . pro-
grammatic ad-buying algorithms to reduce the likelihood of embedding 
                                                          
 108. See Balkin, supra note 105, at 1208; Levi, supra note 67, at 285. 
 109. See Adam Mosseri, A New Educational Tool Against Misinformation, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM 
(Apr. 6, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/a-new-educational-tool-against-misinfor-
mation/. 
 110. Id.; see also Levi, supra note 67, at 285. 
 111. Aja Romano, Mark Zuckerberg Lays Out Facebook’s 3-Pronged Approach to Fake News, VOX 
(Apr. 3, 2018, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/4/3/17188332/zuckerberg-kinds-of-
fake-news-facebook-making-progress. 
 112. Levi, supra note 67, at 290. 
 113. Id. at 325. 
 114. See Alex Roarty, Americans Blame Facebook for Fake News, New Poll Finds, MCCLATCHY, 
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article175970831.html (last updated Sept. 
29, 2017, 5:35 PM); see also Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 
2016 Election, 31(2) J. OF ECON. PERSP. 211, 216 (2017). 
 115. Levi, supra note 67, at 293. 
 116. See Stephen Battaglio, YouTube Tells Advertisers it’s ‘Devoted’ to Keeping Ads Off Offensive 
Videos, STAR (May 5, 2018), https://www.thestar.com/business/tech_news/2018/05/05/youtube-tells-
advertisers-its-devoted-to-keeping-ads-off-offensive-videos.html; see also Sapna Maheshwari, Face-
book Moves to Keep Ads from Running on Objectionable Videos, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/media/facebook-ads.html?_r=0. 
 117. See Battaglio, supra note 116. 
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brands’ ads in ‘fake news’ or other commercially undesirable content. Fur-
thermore, to the extent that social bots play a significant role in the dis-
semination of ‘fake news’ soon after it is published, attempts to reveal and 
thus curb bot accounts might be a useful step in tackling the ‘fake news’ 
problem.118 
Accordingly, advertisers wield significant power when it comes to online self-
regulation of fake news content. Strangely, this harkens back to the concept of the 
Marketplace of Ideas, where good speech trumps bad.119 When advertisers experi-
ence negative societal pressures by being associated with fake news to hate speech, 
they respond in kind.120 Thus, financial pressures may lead to favorable technolog-
ical solutions that discredit or lessen the impact of fake news content. Although 
such solutions are arguably far from mass adoption or implementation, the notion 
demonstrates that workable solutions that do not implicate the First Amendment 
exist. Instead, by strategically targeting ad placements, the industry can encourage 
users to consume truthful content about matters of public concern rather than fake 
news. Moreover, by limiting the financial incentive to create fake news content, the 
advertising sector can help decrease the amount of fake news content available in 
the market. 
B. Media Literacy 
Regulatory and technological solutions designed to mitigate the effects of fake 
news are just knee-jerk reactions to the problems plaguing our society; they are 
often enacted swiftly and usually do not receive a proper vetting before being im-
plemented. Thus, while admirable, such solutions alone are not typically enough to 
curtail the damage. Further, the long-term impact of removing content from the 
Marketplace of Ideas is surely one that merits significant consideration. Truthfully, 
education and awareness are the best defenses against false content. Thus, media 
literacy among the public and content creators remains essential in the fight against 
fake news. Although scholars have advocated for media literacy for years, calls for 
education in this arena have become more prevalent in light of the fake news epi-
demic.121 
Scholars tend to assume that Internet users, particularly today’s “Digital Na-
tives,”122 come to the table with skills necessary to navigate the information-rich 
digital world.123 In reality, the opposite is true, and there is a strong argument to be 
made that citizens of all ages need media literacy training now more than ever. A 
                                                          
 118. Levi, supra note 67, at 294. 
 119. See Thorson & Stohler, supra note 77. 
 120. See Tanya Dua, YouTube is Trying to Flip its Brand Safety Mess into an Opportunity, BUS. 
INSIDER (May 5, 2018, 11:32 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/youtube-is-trying-to-flip-its-latest-
brand-safety-mess-into-an-opportunity-2018-5. 
 121. See Michael Rosenwald, Making Media Literacy Great Again, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Fall 
2017), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/media-literacy-trump-fake-news.php. 
 122. The term Digital Native refers to children born into the digital era as opposed to those who learned 
their digital skills as adults. See Marc Prensky, Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants, 9 ON THE HORIZON 
1 (2001), https://www.marcprensky.com/writing/Prensky%20-%20Digital%20Natives,%20Digi-
tal%20Immigrants%20-%20Part1.pdf. 
 123. See generally The Fallacy of the ‘Digital Native’, ECDL FOUND., http://ecdl.org/policy-publica-
tions/digital-native-fallacy (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). 
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recent study conducted by Stanford University researchers indicates that modern 
students—the generation that has grown up in the digital world—are easily duped 
when it comes to identifying fake news content.124 Thankfully, the rise of media 
literacy and education programs can address this challenge. The push for media 
literacy must include education that promotes the ability to access, analyze, evalu-
ate, create, and act using all forms of communication, and it must teach audiences 
how to think critically, identify author goals, and understand the role of media in 
society.125 
Unfortunately, increasing the public’s media literacy skills alone is not enough 
to combat the impact of fake news on society. Efforts on the part of both publishers 
and content creators are needed to ensure access to truthful information about mat-
ters of public concern because even the most adept content consumer can be 
thwarted by publisher or platform obstacles that limit access to factual content or 
obscure the original sourcing of content. Therefore, we call on publishers and 
broadcasters to ensure that truthful information—the very fact-based, verified re-
porting that Chris Cillizza contrasts with fake news—gets into the hands of those 
who need it most, so readers do not turn to fake news sources.126 As a justification 
for the proposals we outline below, we rely heavily on Jerome Barron’s Access 
Theory.127 As the Supreme Court once noted, “[a] true marketplace of ideas existed 
in which there was relatively easy access to the channels of communication.”128 
However, economic disparity and the rising cost to produce journalism has limited 
many in their pursuit of viable information.129 Barron’s Access Theory presupposes 
that the marketplace is not totally free for all; rather, it is skewed in favor of those 
with greater economic resources—the institutionalized press in particular.130 We 
agree, and advocate that certain institutional changes and improvements may rem-
edy the access problem and improve the state of the public discourse. 
C. The Problem with Paywalls 
Quality journalism comes at a cost, and modern newsrooms are struggling to 
stay afloat amid declining advertising revenue and resulting budget cuts. This is 
                                                          
 124. Sam Wineburg, Sarah McGrew, Joel Breakstone & Teresa Ortega, Evaluating Information: The 
Cornerstone of Civic Online Reasoning, STAN. HIST. EDUC. GROUP (2016), https://purl.stan-
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 126. See Cillizza, supra note 14. 
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governance. Id. 
 129. See Ken Doctor, Newsonomics: The Halving of America’s Daily Newsrooms, NIEMANLAB (July 
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evidenced by cutbacks to copy-editing131 and international correspondents,132 both 
once considered hallmarks of the institutional press. News organizations, who are 
heavily dependent on advertising revenue, have largely failed to adapt their tradi-
tional business models to compensate for losses that have come in the digital eco-
system.133 Furthermore, Facebook’s rise as a platform for news distribution has im-
paired revenue growth for the institutional press.134 Newsstand and subscription 
revenue can hardly be expected to make up for the waning proceeds from advertis-
ing, and even paywalls that require readers to subscribe to access content had ini-
tially proven largely unsuccessful for many publications.135 
Additionally, the pay-to-read model now used by many traditional news outlets 
creates an unexplored barrier to media literacy and an obstacle to overcoming the 
challenges posed by fake news. Paywalls prevent customers who are either unwill-
ing or unable to pay for news from being able to quickly access reliable sources of 
information to verify questionable content presented on other freely accessed 
sites.136 Digitally distributing news through paywalls, unlike the traditional print 
model, also prevents the possibility of pass-along circulation. No longer can the 
commuter on the bus or train pick up a left-behind copy of the newspaper that he or 
she could otherwise not afford. Today, the existence of paywalls provides a power-
ful deterrent to readers who encounter them while seeking to triangulate infor-
mation.137 This deterrent is a significant disservice to readers who are not in a fi-
nancial position to pay for news. Given that Pew research suggests the use of social 
media for consumption of news increases with youthfulness, it is likely that older, 
less educated audiences are left out in the cold as news organizations transition to 
digital business models that rely heavily on social media.138 At the outset, news 
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Platforms 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (Sep. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-
social-media-platforms-2017/. 
17
Sanders and Jones: Clicks at Any Cost: Why Regulation Won't Upend the Economics of F
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
356 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 2 2018 
organizations must think critically about ways to reconfigure the paywall system to 
promote meaningful access and media literacy in the age of fake news.139 
Although paywalls have been a journalism staple for over two decades,140 news 
sites have implemented some changes in recent years. To encourage readership, for 
example, some outlets including the Washington Post allow consumers to access a 
limited number of articles or videos before instituting a paywall.141 Other sites, such 
as ESPN, make a majority of their content free, but reserve particular “premium” 
content for paid access.142 Though potentially frustrating to those who simply are 
not interested in paying for content, these modified paywall systems allow news 
sites to make some content available for the education of readers. Other media or-
ganizations have further tweaked the paywall system to allow greater access to con-
tent by people who are not able to pay.143 Some online news sites permit readers to 
answer a brief survey for advertising or marketing purposes in exchange for free 
access to the site’s content.144 
Small modifications to the paywall system suggest that media organizations 
can find ways to allow limited access to content without significant sacrifices to 
revenue. To combat fake news, news media must continue to explore potential 
tweaks to the paywall system that promote access. As a writer for the Poynter Insti-
tute suggests, news sites could explore using timers to determine when a user must 
pay for content.145 More effectively, news sites could experiment with dropping 
paywalls when a story becomes popular with increased user clicks serving as an 
indication of a story’s high public interest factor. 
Media organizations could also incentivize consumers on social media plat-
forms to share truthful content that addresses matters of public concern using vari-
ous mechanisms. One approach is to reward users with virtual points or “money” 
that would allow them to purchase access to premium content. Another possibility 
is to provide limited access (a few paragraphs of a story or a small portion of a 
video) to content that is shared via social media platforms. News organizations 
could also try to capitalize on social media influencers by encouraging them to share 
important content and making that content available for limited periods of time 
(perhaps the first two hours after it is shared or in perpetuity once the news is 24 
hours old). We believe the institutional press has an obligation under the First 
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Amendment to find ways to provide meaningful access for the public given its 
unique access to the marketplace. 
D. Subsidization of Content and Promotion of Public Media 
The First Amendment prohibits many forms of speech-restricting regulation, 
but it could serve as a tool to encourage speech-enhancing legislation to advance 
Jerome Barron’s initial emphasis on access to the media.146 Congress has histori-
cally enabled content-neutral subsidization of expression in areas such as the arts, 
and further provisions could be made to subsidize news and information in a view-
point-neutral manner.147 Broadcast television and radio already operate in this man-
ner. For example, the provision of access to public airwaves at no financial cost is 
a subsidization in exchange for the mandate that broadcasters operate in the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity. 
As media consolidation has rocked the broadcast industries, some have be-
moaned broadcasters’ seeming abdication of their public interest obligations.148 Us-
ing the Access Theory as a groundwork, a strong argument could be made that the 
Federal Communications Commission has the right to demand broadcasters toe the 
line on their public interest obligations. Although we are not ready to advocate for 
the return of Fairness Doctrine-era policies,149 others have suggested as much.150 
Instead, we encourage creative ways to incentivize the production of truthful infor-
mation about matters of public concern, whether through grant funding or tax in-
centives. 
In some areas, the private sector has already undertaken similar projects to 
combat fake news and promote the creation of truthful content for audiences strug-
gling to access civic information. Google, for example, has funded a number of 
initiatives under various names aimed at increasing news production and media lit-
eracy.151 Organizations like the Poynter Institute’s International Fact-Checking Net-
work are sponsoring competitions like Fact Forward, where the winner will be 
awarded $50,000 for a project “that can represent a paradigmatic innovation for 
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fact-checkers in any of these areas: (1) formats, (2) business models, [or] (3) tech-
nology-assisted fact-checking.”152 Although other enterprises, such as Facebook’s 
Disputed Flag, may be short-lived,153 their lack of success should not be interpreted 
as a failure. 
VI. CONCLUSION: MORE SPEECH IS NOT ALWAYS BETTER, BUT LESS 
SPEECH IS ALWAYS WORSE 
We do not assert that a single solution will work for all news organizations or 
media markets. Instead, we applaud a variety of ideas that promote audiences’ abil-
ities to have access to factual content. Media literacy skills are essential and must 
be promoted, but as we have indicated, those skills alone will not win the war 
against fake news. Foundational freedom of expression theories suggest that more 
is needed to ensure the public has access to truthful information about matters of 
public concern. Returning to the Marketplace Theory, the best way to counter false 
speech is to shine the light of truth on shoddy sourcing and fabricated content. The 
Self-Governance Theory warns us that citizens who lack proper access to truthful 
information about matters of public concern cannot make informed choices about 
the society in which they exist. Finally, the Access Theory suggests we must con-
tinue to fight the imbalance of power in the marketplace, ensuring that content cre-
ators who wish to disseminate truthful information have the resources to do so—
whether they be members of the institutional press or citizen journalists. We must 
focus on providing economic incentives to support the production and distribution 
of truthful news content. Without strong journalism, our democracy suffers as read-
ers are left to fend for themselves in the fight against fake news. 
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